The conclusion of this thesis is that intellectuals succumb all too easily to political and cultural extremism; none of these three scholars saw themselves as National Socialists, yet each through his anti-Semitism and willingness to cooperate assisted the regime.
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Many socialists have the tragic illusion that by depriving Our generation has forgotten that the system of private private individuals of the power they possess in an individualist property is the most important guarantee of freedom. It is only system, and transferring this power to society, they thereby extin- because the control of the means of production is divided among guish power. What they overlook is that by concentrating power many people acting independently that we as individuals can so that it can be used in the service of a single plan, it is not merely decide what to do with ourselves.
In the hands of private indi- The effect of this success was to create among men a new sense viduals, what is called economic power can be an instrument of of power over their own fate, the belief in the unbounded poss- coercion, but it is never control over the whole life of a person. But ibilities of improving their own lot. What had been achieved came when economic power is centralized as an instrument of political to be regarded as a secure and imperishable possession, acquired power it creates a degree of dependence scarcely distinguishable once and for all; and the rate of progress began to seem too slow.
It has been well said that, in a country where the sole Moreover the principles which had made this progress possible employer is the state, opposition means death by slow starvation. It might be said that the very success of liber- alism became the cause of its decline. Background to danger No sensible person should have doubted that the economic Individualism, in contrast to socialism and all other forms of principles of the nineteenth century were only a beginning — that totalitarianism, is based on the respect of Christianity for the there were immense possibilities of advancement on the lines on individual man and the belief that it is desirable that men should which we had moved.
But according to the views now dominant, be free to develop their own individual gifts and bents. We have in effect spread into what we know as Western civilization. The result largely carries on where the Germans left off. The Germans, long of this growth surpassed all expectations. Wherever the barriers to before the Nazis, were attacking liberalism and democracy, capit- the free exercise of human ingenuity were removed, man became alism, and individualism.
By the begin- Long before the Nazis, too, the German and Italian social- ning of the twentieth century the working man in the Western world ists were using techniques of which the Nazis and fascists later had reached a degree of material comfort, security and personal made effective use.
It was not the fascists but the socialists who began desires, of course, that we should handle our common problems to collect children at the tenderest age into political organizations with as much foresight as possible. The dispute between the to direct their thinking.
It is a dispute hiking, in party clubs where the members would not be infected about what is the best way of so doing. The question is whether we by other views. And it was socialism that had killed it. It is important not to confuse opposition against the latter To many who have watched the transition from socialism to kind of planning with a dogmatic laissez faire attitude. The liberal fascism at close quarters the connection between the two systems argument does not advocate leaving things just as they are; it has become increasingly obvious, but in the democracies the favours making the best possible use of the forces of competi- majority of people still believe that socialism and freedom can tion as a means of coordinating human efforts.
It is based on the be combined. They do not realize that democratic socialism, the conviction that, where effective competition can be created, it is a great utopia of the last few generations, is not only unachievable, better way of guiding individual efforts than any other. And it regards the same drawing together of forces and nearly the same contempt competition as superior not only because in most circumstances of all that is liberal in the old sense.
There can be no doubt that most of those in the democracies who The successful use of competition does not preclude some types demand a central direction of all economic activity still believe of government interference. For instance, to limit working hours, that socialism and individual freedom can be combined.
Yet to require certain sanitary arrangements, to provide an extensive socialism was early recognized by many thinkers as the gravest system of social services is fully compatible with the preservation threat to freedom. For example, the harmful effects of was frankly authoritarian. The French writers owner of the property in question. But the fact that we have to resort who laid its foundation had no doubt that their ideas could be put to direct regulation by authority where the conditions for the proper into practice only by a strong dictatorial government.
Democracy and socialism have nothing in able people. Mere common sense proves a treacherous guide in common but one word: equality. Although competition can bear some mixture of regula- democracy seeks equality in liberty, socialism seeks equality in tion, it cannot be combined with planning to any extent we like restraint and servitude. The word had planning against competition. Now it was made to mean freedom from necessity, reserved for each other the hatred of the heretic.
Their practice release from the compulsion of the circumstances which inevitably showed how closely they are related. To both, the real enemy, the limit the range of choice of all of us. Freedom in this sense is, of man with whom they had nothing in common, was the liberal of course, merely another name for power or wealth. The demand for the old type. While to the Nazi the communist and to the commu- the new freedom was thus only another name for the old demand nist the Nazi, and to both the socialist, are potential recruits for a redistribution of wealth.
Yet it is this What is promised to us as the Road to Freedom is in fact the false hope as much as anything which drives us along the road to Highroad to Servitude. Not that Democratic assemblies cannot function as planning agencies. Fascism is the They cannot produce agreement on everything — the whole direc- stage reached after communism has proved an illusion, and it has tion of the resources of the nation — for the number of possible proved as much an illusion in Russia as in pre-Hitler Germany.
The relative ease with which a young communist could be To draw up an economic plan in this fashion is even less converted into a Nazi or vice versa was well known, best of all to possible than, for instance, successfully to plan a military the propagandists of the two parties. The communists and Nazis campaign by democratic procedure. As in strategy, it would clashed more frequently with each other than with other parties become inevitable to delegate the task to experts.
The cry for an economic dictator is a characteristic fascism at close quarters, the connection between the two systems stage in the movement toward planning. The realization of the socialist programme means the Thus the legislative body will be reduced to choosing the destruction of freedom. Democratic socialism, the great utopia of persons who are to have practically absolute power.
The whole the last few generations, is simply not achievable. Yet this does not mean that our fascist for the widespread belief that, so long as power is conferred by system would in the end prove very different or much less intol- democratic procedure, it cannot be arbitrary; it is not the source of erable than its prototypes.
There are strong reasons for believing power which prevents it from being arbitrary; to be free from dictat- that the worst features of the totalitarian systems are phenomena orial qualities, the power must also be limited. It is for this reason that the unscru- subordinated. To a limited extent we ourselves experience this pulous are likely to be more successful in a society tending toward fact in wartime, when subordination of almost everything to the totalitarianism.
Who does not see this has not yet grasped the full immediate and pressing need is the price at which we preserve our width of the gulf which separates totalitarianism from the essen- freedom in the long run. The fashionable phrases about doing for tially individualist Western civilization.
The old socialist parties were inhibited by their loudly and frequently. It will be those whose vague and imper- democratic ideals; they did not possess the ruthlessness required fectly formed ideas are easily swayed and whose passions and for the performance of their chosen task. It is characteristic that emotions are readily aroused who will thus swell the ranks of the both in Germany and in Italy the success of fascism was preceded totalitarian party.
They were unwilling wholeheartedly to the leader must appeal to a common human weakness. It seems employ the methods to which they had pointed the way.
Others had positive task. In any case, this technique There are three main reasons why such a numerous group, has the great advantage of leaving the leader greater freedom of with fairly similar views, is not likely to be formed by the best but action than would almost any positive programme.
Advancement within a totalitarian group or party depends First, the higher the education and intelligence of individuals largely on a willingness to do immoral things.
The principle become, the more their tastes and views are differentiated. There is literally nothing which the where the more primitive instincts prevail. He must of necessity. Acts which revolt all our feelings, such as the really the same as those they have always held, but which were shooting of hostages or the killing of the old or sick, are treated not properly understood or recognized before.
Few traits of totalitarian regimes are at the same time of policy approved by almost everybody except the victims. It is a him. In the totalitarian machine there will be special opportuni- word used as freely in totalitarian states as elsewhere.
Indeed, ties for the ruthless and unscrupulous. Neither the Gestapo nor it could almost be said that wherever liberty as we know it has the administration of a concentration camp, neither the Ministry been destroyed, this has been done in the name of some new of Propaganda nor the SA or SS or their Russian counterparts freedom promised to the people. Even among us we have planners are suitable places for the exercise of humanitarian feelings.
This is the Knight, correctly notes that the authorities of a collectivist state confusion of freedom with power carried to the extreme. But the minority who will retain an inclination to criti- would dislike the possession and exercise of power is on a level cize must also be silenced. This is brought about by Control extends even to subjects which seem to have no polit- propaganda and by complete control of all sources of information.
There must be no spontaneous, unguided activity, because it might produce results which cannot Planning vs. Nothing distinguishes more clearly a free country from a country The principle extends even to games and amusements.
I leave under arbitrary government than the observance in the former of it to the reader to guess where it was that chess players were the great principles known as the Rule of Law. Thus, within is established, but can be found everywhere among those who have the known rules of the game, the individual is free to pursue his embraced a collectivist faith.
The worst oppression is condoned if it personal ends, certain that the powers of government will not be is committed in the name of socialism. Intolerance of opposing ideas used deliberately to frustrate his efforts. The tragedy of collectivist thought is that while it Socialist economic planning necessarily involves the very starts out to make reason supreme, it ends by destroying reason.
The planning authority cannot tie itself down in There is one aspect of the change in moral values brought advance to general rules which prevent arbitrariness. It is that the virtues which are held less and less in be raised or how many buses are to run, which coal-mines are esteem in Britain and America are precisely those on which Anglo- to operate, or at what prices shoes are to be sold, these decisions Saxons justly prided themselves and in which they were gener- cannot be settled for long periods in advance.
They depend inevit- ally recognized to excel. These virtues were independence and ably on the circumstances of the moment, and in making such self-reliance, individual initiative and local responsibility, the decisions it will always be necessary to balance, one against the successful reliance on voluntary activity, non-interference with other, the interests of various persons and groups.
The difference between the two kinds of rule is important. It is the same as that between providing signposts and commanding It is revealing that few planners today are content to say that people which road to take. The state ceases to be a piece of utilitarian machinery One argument frequently heard is that the complexity of intended to help individuals in the fullest development of their indi- modern civilization creates new problems with which we cannot vidual personality and becomes an institution which deliberately hope to deal effectively except by central planning.
This argument discriminates between particular needs of different people, and is based upon a complete misapprehension of the working of allows one man to do what another must be prevented from doing. The very complexity of modern conditions makes It must lay down by a legal rule how well off particular people shall competition the only method by which a coordination of affairs be and what different people are to be allowed to have.
It could effectively survey all the facts. Under competition — and under no other economic order — In a planned society the law must legalize what to all intents the price system automatically records all the relevant data. Entre- and purposes remains arbitrary action.
If the law says that such preneurs, by watching the movement of comparatively few prices, a board or authority may do what it pleases, anything that board as an engineer watches a few dials, can adjust their activities to or authority does is legal — but its actions are certainly not subject those of their fellows.
By giving the government unlimited powers Compared with this method of solving the economic problem the most arbitrary rule can be made legal; and in this way a demo- — by decentralization plus automatic coordination through cracy may set up the most complete despotism imaginable.
It is no exaggeration to say liberal age and is one of its greatest achievements. It is the legal that if we had had to rely on central planning for the growth of our embodiment of freedom. In the United States a highly protectionist policy aided created. The division of labour has gone far beyond what could the growth of monopolies. In Germany the growth of cartels has have been planned. Any further growth in economic complexity, since been systematically fostered by deliberate policy.
The growth of ized capital and organized labour, which support the monopol- monopoly, however, seems not so much a necessary consequence istic organization of industry. The recent growth of monopoly is of the advance of technology as the result of the policies pursued largely the result of a deliberate collaboration of organized capital in most countries. Through this approach, socialist had clear road In this work Hayek describes the "Professional sellers of ideas" - the intellectuals who shape public opinion.
Through this approach, socialist had clear road to serfdom. The only way to defend free market, is a radical preaching for freedom to once again make it attractive intellectually.
Sure conclusions are similar to the conclusions of Ayn Rand, but the creator of objectivism has gone much further. I would recommend this book to others libertarians, but work has heavy style, which is hard to read. Good essay. I want, however, to quote this incidental bit: "If we still think [the intellectual] wrong, we must recognize that it may be genuine error which leads the well-meaning and intelligent people who occupy those key positions in our society to spread views which to us appear a threat to our civilization[1].
I am much more excited to read the rest of his works now! Sep 09, Kevin Vejrup rated it it was ok. This review has been hidden because it contains spoilers. To view it, click here. Et flertal af disse intellektuelle har angiveligt velmenende, omend skadelige, socialistiske holdninger. Jul 09, Sean Rosenthal rated it liked it Shelves: non-fiction , economics. Interesting Quote: "It may be that as a free society as we have known it carries in itself the forces of its own destruction, that once freedom has been achieved it is taken for granted and ceases to be valued, and that the free growth of ideas which is the essence of a free society will bring about the destruction of the foundations on which it depends.
Hayek, the Intellectuals and Socialism Interesting Quote: "It may be that as a free society as we have known it carries in itself the forces of its own destruction, that once freedom has been achieved it is taken for granted and ceases to be valued, and that the free growth of ideas which is the essence of a free society will bring about the destruction of the foundations on which it depends.
Hayek, the Intellectuals and Socialism Hayek " Apr 02, Jamees rated it it was ok. Adam Andreoli rated it liked it Nov 10, Lautas rated it liked it Jun 17, Mateusz Budzar rated it really liked it Jan 30, Dominik rated it it was ok Jul 24, John Hood rated it really liked it Oct 27, Pedro G rated it really liked it Apr 03, Ivana rated it it was amazing Feb 16, Sue Law rated it really liked it Dec 28, There are no discussion topics on this book yet.
Be the first to start one ». Readers also enjoyed. About Friedrich A. Friedrich A. Friedrich August von Hayek CH was an Austrian and British economist and philosopher known for his defense of classical liberalism and free-market capitalism against socialist and collectivist thought.
He is considered by some to be one of the most important economists and political philosophers of the twentieth century. Hayek's account of how changing prices communicate signals which enable indivi Friedrich August von Hayek CH was an Austrian and British economist and philosopher known for his defense of classical liberalism and free-market capitalism against socialist and collectivist thought.
Hayek's account of how changing prices communicate signals which enable individuals to coordinate their plans is widely regarded as an important achievement in economics. Hayek also wrote on the topics of jurisprudence, neuroscience and the history of ideas. Hayek is one of the most influential members of the Austrian School of economics, and in shared the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with Gunnar Myrdal "for their pioneering work in the theory of money and economic fluctuations and for their penetrating analysis of the interdependence of economic, social and institutional phenomena.
While this meant, on the one hand, that Labour's intellectual wherewithal was refiormisi, ir-s empiricisn-r, ancl the resulting research and documentation with which the traditional intellectuals backecl their plogramme f'or the Labour Party did more than anything else to ellsure its success.
This distinctive trajectoly reached full fruition when, after the Second World War, Labour indisputably held the credentials ol the 'thinking man's party', as opposed to the then still predominantly unintellectual Conservative Party the 'stupid party'. These con- ditions were, roughly, that the Labour Party should accept thern as its sole intellectual mentors, and that it should remain essentially a 'bourgeois party of reform'. Challenge to Unintellectualisrn In the context of Britain's first crisis of modernisation the upheavals of industrial clevelopment threw up political movelnents for the reform ol' archaic institutions and privileges.
But among these Jeremy Bentham's Utilitarianism achieved the greatest critical elaboration, and best encapsulated and systematised bourgeois demands for reform. Bentham's highly abstract ancl rationalistic philosophy was rellectecl in systematic treatises on the reorganisation of society, its laws ancl institutiolls, on the basis ol rationalism ancl utility - a radical Enlightenn'rent intellectual project if' ever there was one. In his own lifetime he exerted an international influence well-known and admired in European intellectual circles and the philosopher of choice in South American essays in collstitutioll- making.
The trajectory his ideas traced in Britain, howeverl is worth pondering; it is widely held that the annals of nineteenth century relorm legislation and administration contain few laws and initiatives which cannot be traced to Bentham's influence, yet Utilitarianism never became a hegemor.
Politically unsuccessful for most o[ his life, Bentham's largely post- humous influence is traced to the circle which forrned around him late in his life after he was sixty.
In the pervasive reaction which followed the French Revolution, Bentharn sought and lound a new constituency among the Philosophic Radicals and the new intellectual element in the Whig Party clrawn lrorn the professions, especially graduates of the Scottish universities.
However, their intellectual link to Bentharn was at best incomplete and their political aims discrete and diminutive ir. His disciples were an instrument, but one that decisively altered the procluct. They rejected his system while retaining what they saw to be his method, above all his rigoul and attention to detail. These were then held up as his distinctive contribution. This task provecl awkward, however, as its ratiorralism struck a strarlge note in the age ol romzurticism.
When the youngcr- Mill encountered rornallticism, he was overwhelmed, as were other Utilit- arians. Indeed, as William Thomas points out, 'they dicl not put up a fight'. The newly refolrned Parliament ol the IB3os and 4os was unresponsive to lurther reltrrming ambitions. The threat of the Chartist unlest from below, made more ominous by the resonance in it of continental revolutionary ambitions, became another reason for the new bourgeoisie to accept the political status quo.
The elfort to form a cohelent palty of' the Philosophic Raclicals lvas judgecl in retrospect byJ. Mill, as l. Philosophic Rad- icalism mergecl with other elenlents such as the Peelites and Free- traders into English Liberalism dr-rring the long mid-Victorian period of' prosperity that fbllowed. Now thc tetrsion was clroppecl in lavour of a one sidecl emphasis on laisse4. The fabled influence ol Bentham on nineteenth century legislation is usually seen as a product of pressure and advocacy by the many followers of Bentham in parlia- ment or the administration.
This, however, exaggerates its public profile. Deprived of public recognition, Utilitarianism was sequestered, reduced almost to a style. It imparted 'a certain toughness of mind, a fearless hard-hitting logic Both were llow inoculated against 'the ruir. Within Britain's ruling institrrtions Colericlge's influence was as wide- spread as Bentham's was circumscribed. Bentham had questioned society and its institutions and sor-rght to relorm them according to a systematic philosophy; Coleridge sought to discover the wisdom of existing ir-lstitutions and to nraintain a balance between 'permanence' and 'progress'.
Most ol his philosophy derived lrom contemporary Idealist Gcrman philosophers and he gave England the equivalent ol the cor. It expresses the revolt o[ tl-re human rnind against the philosophy ol the eighteenth century. It is ontological, because that rvas experimental; conservative, because that lvas innovative ; religious, because so much ol that r,vas infidel; concrete and his- torical, because that lvas abstl'act and metaphysical; poetical, becattse that rvas matter-of-lact and prosaic.
It became, as well, the champion ol an idealised historical con- tinuity ar. In this. In this encounter, Benthamism was defeated and denatured. Coleridgean Romanticism also served the continuity ol hegemonic dominance ol the rulir.
Against mechauism, the amassing of f'ortur. A clerisy woulcl be 'a morally and religiously souncl clergy and aristocracy to scrve as a cultural elite that would restore the community of' England.
Lord Noel Annan, a leacling romancer of the British intellectual tradition, celebrates them as the 'Bill of Rights' of Britain's intellectuals. There is also strong agreement in tracing tl. However, as Peter Gowan has recently shown, while there was some initial Benthamite impulse towards reform, the actual con- ception as well as stewardship of the reforms was the work of Coler- -fl.
The crux of this restoration was to harness civil service entrallcc exams to the curriculum of Oxford and Cambridge which actually narrowed the social range of recruitment. The principal advocates of reform were the lower ranks of the landed ruling class itself, not the industrial bourgeoisie clamouring f'or hrrther avellues for material and social advancement.
The cer. And the one place in England which clid produce efficient, meritocratic adminis- trators --Haileybury College, the creation of' Bentham andJamcs Mill, founded in r8o6 to train the highel echelons of Indian Civil Service was closed.
Here too, the initial external Utilitarian pressurc was ovcltaken by an internal Coleridgean initiative. Their heavily religious curricnlnm, aimecl at produc- ing a clergy ancl governir. Dissenters also wanted to loosen the holcl of the Church of' Englancl on the ancient universities and to end their exclusior. This campaign provoked an internal counter-movement for refbrm among some dons and students who, inspired by the ideas of Coleridge, wished to reform the universities before the insensitive hands of the state lorced a chauge.
Royal Commissions set up in rB5o and r85z to recommend char. But the curriculum itself clttng even more closely to the newly establishecl but resolutely aristoclatic canons of 'cultivation', rather than utility, Alter tl're reforms the ancient univer- sities still remained small and exclusive.
Moreover, their reputations soared, re-establishing their pre-eminence in tsritish cltlture and con- signing the newer universities, ancl the values they represeuted, to a clearly subordinate status, Establishecl mainly by Dissenters ancl Utilit- arians, at Mancllester, Birmingham, Liverpool, Leeds, and ol course, Londor-r, and represeuting as they did a link with industrial wealth, tl. There, if the aristocracy of birth was rrow slightly cliluted by merit aud taleut, the aristocratic, elitist ethos ancl thc basic structttre ol society would nevertheless be rnaintainecl, and eveu enhanced.
Outsicle the Utilit- arian system, however, these ideas took the lorm of a positive ar-rti- intellectualism. Even scieuce was scorued as a thcoretical pursuit. Wher-r Stepliensoll ,yvas asked ho'"v he hacl inventecl his rnachil.
In fact intcllectuals as they havc been defined in the last chapter as ploduccrs of social theory were not prominent on the cultural tcrrair. Gaskell reported the poverty of rvolking-class life, ol rvhen Carlyle ,"varnecl of social revolutiot. This close conucction rvhich is indeed celebratcd by tl.
In sl. Moreover, even as such they remained closely tied to the ruling class which was for the great majority their class of origin. They did not, like traditional intcllectuals, form a separate social category with an independent institutional structure of its own. They formed new institutions and lorums ol' tlieir own like Toynbee Hall, tl.
But this new kincl ol intellectual neverthcless remained close to the rr-rlir. The whole point of the relorms at Oxlord ar"rd Cambridge had been to reinf'orce at once the ir social exclusivity and through their pre-ernineuce, aristocratic-gentry cultnral hegemony in English intellectual life.
Indeed, in the trair. This netwol'k includecl families frorn all parts ol the now composite ruling class: Clapham Sect, Quaker and other non-conforn-rist families; Church ol England families touchecl with evangelicalisrn; ar. Yet the English intelligentsia, r. Rather they we re an emergent new stratum ol comfortably-off prolessionals, but with a vantage point sufficiently at variance with that of the ruling class to have a world view independent of the ruling order, aud possibly some- what critical of it.
Liberals and Social Dernocrats The new intellectuals of the late nineteenth century hacl inherited a political allegiance to the radical-liberal alliance which had clominated parliament from to However, the liberal legacy, a peculiar combination of high-minded principle iu internatioual affairs and social quietism at home, seemed increasingly incongruous in the face ol thc Great Depression.
The plevailing unemployment, poverty and squalor, as well as growing working-class orgJauisation, became new concerlls, In responding to them, the intellectr-rals becarne more critical and more radical.
This intellectual evolution, vividly reconstructed by Peter Clarke in lris book Liberak and Social Democrats, lecl tl. Such a ran- sition was made, however, not so much by abandoning the intellectual traditions they had inherited, as by elaborating then-r towards the left, in response to the social problems ger.
British society faced, of coul'se, no organised threat from Marxism, which had constituted such an impetus lor contineutal sociology. The Marxist Social Democratic Fed- eratior. On the otl. Ol course, deeply rooted lorms of' socialist beliel did play art important role in building up tlle orgat. There were also specifically intellectual lactors in the absence of sociology. The nascent sociological strain that cor-rld be discerne d in British lde alism at tl.
Mill proved usehrl, ol course. So, more surprisingly, dicl British Hegelianism. Hobhouse commended T. His challenge to the theory ol natulal rights exemplifies the new intellectual reorientation.
If, therefore, any light to any lorm ol propelty or lreedom rro lotrgel serves a good social purpose, it must go. In some respects this was evell more remarkable. Althor"rgh tl. Such cliscrete, theoretically unintegratecl critical impulses attacked the irrationality and inhumanity of capitalisrn.
The common aim was to reform it piecen-real into a more rational and humaue social order in which inequalities ol wealth and incomes woulcl be drastically reduced and democratic rights extendecl and substantiated, and ir-r wliich the still marginalised and alienated working class would be integratecl into tlre political systen.
In a cultural lar. Since liberal theory appeared to be so fully committed to laisseTfaire All these rvould automatically tencl to be regarcled as 'socialist', a term lvhich, even in r8g7, in the r,volds of an intel- ligent Frer-rchrnan close to the lrabians, lneant no more than 'any doctrine opposed to laisseTfaire The new intellectuals were still by and large educated in the only mildly reformed central universities.
It is perhaps significant that the only plomir. Their original idea of' the agent ol socialism was a specialised and technocratic version of a 'clerisy'. What was needed, Siclney Webb contendecl, was a small educated elite, 'supplying icleas ancl principles of social recoustruction to each of tl're great political parties iu turtt, as the cllatlging results of English politics br-ing them alternately to power. The Liberal task was to win over the uneducated masses to the side ol intellect.
As they saw it, '[t]he ideas of socialism, when translated into practical terms, coincide with the ideas to which Liberals are led when they seek to apply their principles of Liberty, Equality and the Common Good to the industrial life of our titne. The differences between tl. Hobson and the historiansJ. L and Barbara Hammond, who called themselves socialists, on the one hand, and political theorist Graham Wallas and the editor ol the Manclrcster Guardian, C.
Instead, they hoped to integrate the working class into a progressive New Liberalism. II'r this regard it is important to bear in mind that the wider culture of public lile still remained largely unintellectual. No major Couservative ir. Conservatism was simply embodied in the decply en- trenched attitucles and practices of the British governing elite.
Only such a programme whir:h was attractive to the working-class electorate could lashion a new majoritarian plogressive political force and give Liberalism a new lease of lil'e. Events were to prove him right, l-rowever, only in unexpectecl ways.
I espite the l'ropelul portents of the great relorming Liberal adminis- tration ol r9o5'-ro, which ir. In fact the Great War was the occasior. Cornbinecl with the beginnings of an exodus ol New Liberal intellectuals towarcls Labour, these developments encouragecl the Laboul Party to institutionalise its independence from Liberalism. If'tlie clloice benveen the L,iberal Party and the f,abour Party rvas only tactical, this hacl the ell"ect of recluiting Liberal support lronr socialists belore r9r4 and l,abolrr sLrpport lrom liberals after',vards.
A, Clinc ir. The Webbs also finally threw their lot in with the Labour Party. Sidney Webb had helped to dralt tl. Yet although their own principles now pointed to Labour as the appropriate political vehicle for the policies they supported, many intellectuals hesitated to give their allegiance to the Labour Party and make an active political commitment to it.
The Labour Party, seen as a class or a trade union party, speaking for a set of sectional interests, seemed a compromised instrument for a set of intellectuals claiming to speak fbr society as a whole, even though they clearly saw that it needed a 'socialist clergy sucl'r as the German social democrats had created, charged with the ch-rty of thinking for the working class'.
Hobson's decision to join Labour was typical in its misgivings. Although Labour's new 'socialist' constitution of rgrB seemecl likely lLrrther to alienate the intellectr,rals, MacDonald's welcome for them, based on l. Some, however, like Keynes, chose to remain in the Liberal Party ancl their reasons are very insfuctive. Keynes admitted in 19z6 that 'the progressive fbrces of' the country are hopelessly divided between the Liberal party and the Labour party'.
But, by remaining outside the Labour Party, he said, a Liberal at least had the advantage of' being able to 'work out policies without having to do lip service to trade- unionist tyrannies, to the bear-rties of' the class war, or to doctrinaire - in none of which he believes'. Labour''s origins had been empirical and undoctrinaire and as such, it shared the unintellectualism ol tl.
Moreover', class-r'idclen British society had fiostered a labour rnoveme nt intensely cor. How right Keynes was to prove ir. For all that, it was quite an impressive intellectr-ral influx. After the Great War, with Labor-rr's political fortunes rising, and with its aim of proving that Labour could form a cabinet without Liberal help, its leadership could hardly ignore the ready-made pool of talent now at its disposal.
The prc-wal raclicalisation and wartime expansion ol Labour's trade union base had pern. The ex-Liberals contributecl to this expansion by providing canclidates, ministers, funds, ancl arguments. Labour's social- ism, howevet at least under MacDonalcl's leadership, consisted in a combination of fiery rl'retoric :rnd only the most basic ameliorative policies.
Accordingly, on the most urgent policy question of' the Igzos, unemployment, the party saw its role as mainly defending the 'dole'. However; even while such fiscal conservatisnr was incongruous in a 'socialist' party and was certainly a problem, too exclusive an emphasis on it may obscure much of the genuine theoretical confusion of the time.
T3 In Socialisnt in Our Time, publisl'tecl in , the ILP hacl argued tl'rat capitalisrn coulcl never provide a livir-rg wage arrd that pressure upon it to do so would only reveal its bankruptcy and create the political conditions for socialism, The demal-rd for a living wage was a simple one which would make intuitive sense to workers, and tl-ris idea was harnessed by the leaders of the ILP, loremost among them Clifnord Allen, to a policy of taking the legislative initiative, which countered the parliamentary gradualism within the Labour Party.
In Dowse's view, this was a potent intellectual combination, but the ILP could never get it accepted by the trade unions or the Labour Party. Ta But it is also important to note that there were also serious doubts about the theoret- ical consistency and practical viability ol' its Hobsonian economics. Their impact on policy remaiu- ed small.
Or-rly later, alter t93I, did political cilcumstances collspire to give some of them a powerful voice in the determiltation ol Labour policy. This was in large part tlle work ol some uotable young intellectuals who joinecl the Labour Party in the Igzos. The Fabian Hugh l alton was pre-eminent among these. Others even yolrtlger', like Hr"rgh Gaitskell and Evan Dulbin, were corlverted to the cause of Labour during tl. Cole and others, into Labour's newly established policy-making apparatus after I93r.
The evolution of their moderate but effective programme of refortn must, l'rowever, be sifted out from among other more vivid, if evanescent, developrnents which dominated the rg3os. British Intellectuals and the Slurnp The r93os began with clrarlatic everlts. The econorrric slump ancl the consequent unemployment aud poverty ger.
Unable to clelivcr, thc Labour" governmeut lell irr r93r in what was a major political crisis lor the party. An-rong other things, it lecl to hrndamental questiolling ol the parliameutaly road and the possibility of' 'legislating socialist'r-r'. Further; with the adveut ol Hitler to power in Germany, the international situation began to seem increas- ingly ominous and tlie possibility of anothel war becatne more t'eal.
Finally; an impoltar. Most ol the se newly ladical- ised young intellectuals were from 'good' lamilies ancl educated at Oxlold or Can-rbliclge. The inter. The: iutroversious ol 'logical atomism' in philosophy ar. Hc r:ven goes on to compal'e then. At tlic close ol thc clecadc: they r'vere almost all welcomecl back to the establishment fold. As Woocl hir. No doubt the traclitional lar-nily lelationships cush- ionecl the impact ol commur.
B3 And, unlike the scientific and literary bent of the 'commut-tist' intellectr-rals, this affected the primarily 'sociological' intellectuals. This constellation ol 'rniddle opir-rion' notably also included some Conscrvative politiciar. If mechan- istic Fabianism hacl hitherto been a distinctly srnall trer. People lrom all parties as well as some notable bttsiuessmen were behind tl. Douglas-Smith as other Executive members.
B:' Political aud Ecouomic Planr. The National Laboul Cornmittee, made up of the National Labour MPs, was another important nttcletts of like- minded people urging thesc policies upoll the National government' This nerv agreement on planning moved the middle grour. The Socialist Leagr-re included intcllectuals such as G. Colc, E. T, Murphy, H. Brailslord, D. They sought to urge the Labour Party more to the le[t. This eventually pushed them outside 'middle opinion' and the League's support for the idea of'a 'United Front' brought about its proscription by the Labour Party in Organis- ationally and electorally, it had experienced a decade of growtl.
In addition to the defection of the MacDonaldite National Labour gloup in r93r, which led to the fall of the Labour goverllment, the party had suffered two other splits in the previous year: on the left to the ILP led byJames Maxton, and on the right to Sir Oswald Mosley's New Party.
And in the General Election of rgtr most of the remaining party leaders lost their seats. This was tl.
While, of course, the new programme was the result of much collective efftrrt, and o[ complex political tides, the central figure in its making, who stamped the entire process with his own cnergy and inclinations, was Hugh Dalton. BT The influence he exerted over Labour's policy-making in the rg3os was accounted for not least by his ex- ceptional position as an intellectual in the Labour Party of the rg3os.
Dalton was one of the few who lell under the influence of' the Fabians while still a student. A recruit to Labour in the rgeos, he servecl as a junior rninister at the Treasury in the second Labour government of rgzg 3r. The party's heavy losses in the r93r Genelal Electior. This was in large part because Dalton's allegiance to the Labour Party was distinct from that ol the large phalanx ol the ex-Liberal intellectuals in the party.
They had joinecl Labour because it seeme cl to tl. Remaining self-consciously middle-class, they also did not establish close links with the party's union and working- class leadership. B8 The renegade upper-middle class Dalton, however, took to his new anti-establisl. After rg3r he came to be seen as a "'Transport House man", on the side of working class leaders against middle-class intellectuals'.
Be And havir. The leaders in Parliament were too preoccupiecl with parliamentary alfairs to give much attention to long-term policy formulation. So when, in tl. From these positions of influence he was able to direct the emerging Labour Party policy.
Ovel the course of the early rg3os Dalton steered the Labour Party policy process in a distinctive direction, markir. The need lor policy initiatives was recogrlised by rnany alter the debacle of I93r, ancl the ex-guild socialist, G. Cole, had taken tl. The moralistic and impractical attitude which, thanks to the Coles and the generally left-rving climatc of tl. The limitations of the NFRB meant that the real sources ol party policy lay elsewhere. Dalton had begun to recruit a number ol younger socialist economists into the Labour Party and to co-opt them into its policy-making machinery.
Dalton's views, ancl the evolving views ol the Labour Party, remained distinct lrom 'middle opinion' on pl:rnning and intervention. A trip to the Soviet Union in I93z had certainly impressed I alton tr"emendously, ar.
But plannillg, he recognised, was not inherently IVlarxist or even socialist. The ir-rtel- lectual task at hancl, as he saw it, was to elaborate practicable policies lor a short-term or transitional progran'rrne : 'we do better to decicle the direction of aclvance than to debate the cletail of Utopia.
We must see clearly the next stretch ol thc journey. Br-rt we ueecl uot spe nd tirne now arguing whethcr, beyoncl the holizon, tl. It lormed the basis of subsequer.
It was an intellectual direction the trade unions were willing to support and it was along these lines that the Labour Party progressed thenceforth. Dalton, then, was the central figure in the policy-making of the rg3os. The wartime acceptance of Keynesianism and the systematisir.
Their late is the subject ol the rest ol this study. Perry Anclerson, 'Components', p rz. I erry Anclerson, 'Origins', p 4r. At least one ol Bentham's biographers went out of his lvay to combat this vierv of Bentham as narrow, hardened, joyless rationalist. According to Charles Iiverett he certainly did not lack in aesthetic or emotional sympathy.
Il his philosophy did nevertheless exhibit the characteristics r-nentioned above, this '"vas clue to all unwave ring cornrnitment to rationalisnr rathel than to a paucity ol leeling ol knor. Ibid, p 48 9. If Britain rvas to put hel stamp on India, 'Philosophic Raclicalism gave it an intellectual basis and supplied it rvith the sciences of political economy, larv and governurent'. Mill to E. Lytton Bttllver, z3 November I, quotecl in Stokes, op. Perry Ar"rclerson, 'Components', p r3.
Ibid, p 6z Noel Annan, "lhe Intellectr-ral Aristocracy', inJ. Ibid, p r7-rB. I soor. Ibid,p t5.
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